study of the Mariel supply shock remains an important cornerstone of both the literature that measures the labor market impact of immigration, and of the "stylized fact" that immigration might not have much impact on the wage of workers in a receiving country. My recent reappraisal of the Mariel evidence (Borjas, 2017) revealed that the wage of low-skill workers in Miami declined substantially in the years after Mariel, and has already encouraged a number of re-reexaminations. Most recently, Clemens and Hunt (2017) argue that a data quirk in the CPS implies that wage trends in the sample of non-Hispanic prime-age men examined in my paper does not correctly represent what happened to wages in post-Mariel Miami. Specifically, there was a substantial increase in the black share of Miami's low-skill workforce in the relevant period (particularly between the 1979 and 1980 survey years of the March CPS). Because African-American men earn less than white men, this increase in the black share would spuriously produce a drop in the average low-skill wage in Miami. This paper examines the robustness of the evidence presented in my original paper to statistical adjustments that control for the increasing number of black men in Miami's low-skill workforce. The evidence consistently indicates that the race-adjusted low-skill wage in Miami fell significantly relative to the wage in other labor markets shortly after 1980 before fully recovering by 1990.
This short paper examines the robustness of the Mariel evidence presented in my original paper to statistical adjustments that control for the increasing number of black men in Miami's low-skill workforce. The evidence reported in this paper uses exactly the same sample examined throughout much of Borjas (2017) : non-Hispanic men aged 25-59 who live in one of the 44 metropolitan areas identifiable in the CPS during the relevant period. As a result, any changes in the statistical evidence reported below and the comparable findings in my original paper can be attributed solely to the biases created by the changing racial composition of the low-skill workforce.
The statistical analysis clearly shows that although the black share of the low-skill workforce did rise in Miami, particularly in the March CPS and strikingly so in one single
year (survey year 1980) , the evidence consistently indicates that the race-adjusted lowskill wage in Miami fell significantly relative to those in other labor markets shortly after 1980 before fully recovering by 1990.
The timing of the increase in the black share
There is a very simple and intuitive way of showing that the rising black share in Miami's low skill workforce cannot be the reason for the average wage drop observed among low-skill workers in Miami after Mariel. The timing of the two events simply does not coincide. Figure 1 shows the year-by-year trend in the age-adjusted log weekly wage in the March CPS between 1976 and 1990, while Figure 2 shows the respective trend in the ageadjusted log hourly wage in the ORG. All calculations reported throughout the paper use sampling weights. It is worth emphasizing that the wage trends illustrated in Figures 1 and   2 are exactly the ones reported and examined in my Mariel paper.
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The figures also plot the fraction of the low-skill workforce that is black. It is evident that something strange happened to this fraction in calendar year 1979 in the March CPS Figure 1 is the wage trend used in the Borjas (2017) paper-it includes blacks. The figure convincingly shows that there is no relationship whatsoever between the fraction of blacks in the low-skill workforce and the average lowskill wage in those years that the average low-skill wage fell most. Therefore, it is impossible to explain the steep wage drop in terms of a statistical spuriousness created by a rising black share in the low-skill workforce. And this leads to an obvious inference: the Clemens-Hunt argument is not consistent with the timing of the increase in the black share and the drop in the average low-skill wage.
The ORG data in Figure 2 is equally striking. Again, the average low-skill wage in Miami (including blacks) fell dramatically between 1980 and 1984 while the black share rose slightly and then declined slightly over the period-ending up pretty much at the same place it started. There is simply no way that the large wage drop observed in the first few years after Mariel could somehow be related to a change in the racial composition of the low-skill workforce in the ORG. 
Trends in the age-and race-adjusted wage
The most obvious way of isolating the importance of the change in the racial composition of the sample on the average wage is to examine the trend in the race-adjusted wage.
My original paper examines age-adjusted wage trends throughout much of the analysis. I now conduct a parallel exercise that examines the trend in the age-adjusted and race-adjusted wage. In particular, I used the sample of high school dropouts to estimate the following regression model separately in each cross-section of the March CPS or ORG files:
where w it is the weekly wage of worker i in cross-section t in the March CPS (or the hourly wage of the worker in the ORG); A it is a vector of fixed effects indicating the worker's age;
C it is a vector of fixed effects indicating the city of residence; and R it is an indicator variable telling us if the worker is African-American.
The residual of this regression, or e it , measures the age-and race-adjusted wage of worker i at time t. These residuals obviously have zero mean. It is trivial to redefine the residual so that it better reflects the actual wage level in a particular city at a particular time. In particular, let ct be the estimate of the fixed effect for city c in year t. The measure of the age-and race-adjusted wage is then given by the sum (e it + ct + t ). The variables added to the residual effectively allow for a person's age-and race-adjusted wage to differ systematically across cities (due to city fixed effects) and for that wage level to differ systematically over time (due to year fixed effects). 
Log hourly wage
Year All other metro areas Miami something did indeed happen in Miami in the early 1980s in both the March CPS and the ORG. Is it also obvious that whatever it is that happened in Miami led to a substantial and significant decline in the age-and race-adjusted low-skill wage.
Regression analysis
What would happen to the regression results in the key Table 5 of my original paper if one were to redo the entire analysis using the age-and race-adjusted wage of workers?
This remarkably easy and intuitive exercise, which would obviously be the first step in any empirical analysis that attempts to determine the role played by racial composition, is curiously not reported in Clemens and Hunt (2017) . 
Changing the baseline
As Figure 1 I re-estimated the regression models in the March CPS and the ORG using the calendar years 1979-1980 years as the pre-treatment period. Table 2 summarizes the regression coefficients. It is obvious that excluding from the analysis all the CPS March surveys that reported a low share of the black workforce barely changes the results. In fact, an "eyeball"
comparison of the regression coefficients reported in the top panel in Table 2 with the corresponding coefficients in my original paper (Borjas, 2017, 
Combinatorial analysis
As I explicitly noted in my original paper, one of the troubling things about the statistical methodology involved in Mariel-type research is that the researcher can influence the answer by picking an appropriate set of placebo cities for comparison. The increasingly popular synthetic control method is a very clever attempt to get rid of that influence, but it is still problematic. The researcher is still free to select whichever control variables he or she wants to use to create the synthetic city. And, as I show in Borjas (2017) Figure 8 of Borjas (2017) using the age-and race-adjusted wage data, and using exactly the same regression specification for estimating the "short-run wage impact." The short-run effect gives the relative wage change in Miami between the pre-Mariel period (1977) (1978) (1979) and the post-Mariel period (1981) (1982) (1983) (1984) (1985) (1986) . In short, Figures 5 and 6 are identical to what was presented in my original paper, except that they use age-and race-adjusted wage data.
It is again obvious that adjusting the data for race does not change the basic insight.
In the March CPS, the median impact is -0.18, which means the wage drop in Miami before and after Mariel was around 18 percent larger than it was in the median placebo, and the 95 percent confidence interval covers the range between -0.25 and -0.08. Similarly, in the ORG, the median impact is -0.05, and 95 percent of the effects lie between -0.10 and -0.01.
In sum, the short-run wage effect is negative, although the numerical magnitude has a wide range. 
Calculating the race-adjusted wage
In a recent blog post, Clemens (2017) noted that the regression evidence summarized in Table 1 is indeed correct. The race adjustment performed in equation (1) by simply adding a race fixed effect to the micro-level regression model in each cross-section leads to wage trends that still indicate a decline in Miami's low-skill wage after Mariel. This very simple type of race adjustment is, by far, the most straightforward (and parsimonious)
way to fix concerns about sampling.
The blog post, however, also notes that an alternative approach to adjusting for race-where the race variable in each cross-section is introduced not only as a fixed effect, but as a fixed effect interacted with metropolitan area and education (so that the racial wage gap for an education group in a particular city is allowed to vary over time)-takes away much of the significant wage drop. In an important sense, this response moves the "goalpost" of the Clemens-Hunt criticism of my Mariel paper. It is no longer that the change in the black share of the workforce induced a spurious correlation that led to lower wages in post-Mariel Miami; the evidence reported in the previous sections shows that this particular argument is just plain wrong. It is now instead that the measured wage impact of Mariel could be zero if we calculate the race-adjusted wage by allowing for the racial wage gap for low-skill workers to vary over time in a city like Miami.
Let's put aside momentarily the conceptual issue of whether it is proper to calculate the race-adjusted wage by netting out the time-series variation in the racial wage gap within a city (a variation that may have arisen because of immigration). If we had a lot of data available, the conventional approach to estimating the race-adjusted wage would be to include a fully interacted set of fixed effects in the regression model. The fully interactive regression specification used to calculate the age-and race-adjusted wage for worker i would be given by:
(
where the vector (C it S it A it R it ) denotes all possible two-, three-, and four-way interactions among all variables-the city fixed effects (C it ), the education fixed effects (S it ), the age fixed effects (A it ), and the variable indicating the worker's race (R it ). Because the micro-level regression is estimated separately in each CPS cross-section, the model is also fully interactive with respective to time. Therefore, this model allows variation in the racial wage gap across age-education-city cells at a point in time and within each cell over time.
The age-and race-adjusted wage is given by the residual of this regression, and I use this residual to calculate the mean age-and race-adjusted wage in each city in each year for high school dropouts. The top panel of Table 3 summarizes the regression results using this alternative measure of the age-and race-adjusted wage. The magnitude of the estimated wage impacts is far smaller (particularly in the March CPS) than in the comparable regressions that excluded all the interactions in Table 1 . This is not surprising because the use of a fully interactive model nets out much of the wage variation that exists across the various "markets." The typical March CPS cross-section in the 1980s, for instance, has 8,865
observations. The fully interactive model adds 2,816 regressors to the regression (or 44 metro areas × 4 education groups × 8 age groups × 2 race groups). Given the relatively small sample sizes available in the March cross-sections and the large number of regressors, it is also not surprising that this kitchen-sink approach reduces the precision of the estimates in Table 3 sufficiently so that the null hypothesis of "no effect" can no longer be rejected. Remarkably, many of the wage impacts remain negative and significant in the ORG, particularly when there is more variation in the data (as in the regression that compares Miami to all other cities). So there is still a suggestion that low-skill workers in post-Mariel Miami experienced a steeper wage drop than comparable workers in other cities.
However, it is far from clear that one should interpret the regression coefficients resulting from this fully interactive model as measuring the wage impact of immigration. As I noted above, the variation in the racial wage gap for a particular education group across cities and over time might have arisen because of immigration. It seems plausible, for instance, that a supply shock might affect the wage and employment of low-skill black and white workers differently. 2 There are substantial differences in the jobs the two groups hold, in the occupations they enter, and in the industries that employ them. A particular supply shock-such as Mariel-inevitably penetrated some sectors more than others, affecting the magnitude of the racial wage gap for a particular education group in Miami relative to other cities. The residual from a regression that nets out this differential impact removes much of the effect that immigration might have had on the local labor market. As a result, it would not be surprising if models that calculate the race-adjusted wage after netting out the impact that immigration might have had on the racial wage gap generate smaller, and perhaps near zero, measured impacts of immigration.
To illustrate the quantitative importance of this bias, the second panel of Table 3 uses an alternative model that relies on binary interactions.
2 Very few studies estimate the potentially disparate impact of immigration on black and white workers. Borjas, Grogger, and Hanson (2010) model the source of the different effects, but do not separately estimate the impact of immigration on low-skill blacks and whites. The wage elasticity-estimated using data from all education groups-is essentially the same for the two race groups, but immigration has a much greater adverse effect on black employment. Smith (2012, Table 8 ) also finds that low-skill immigration leads to a much greater reduction in annual hours worked by black young men than by white young men. The early work of Altonji and Card (1991, Tables 7.8 and 7.9, column 4) does estimate the elasticity separately for the two low-skill groups. The negative wage effect is almost twice as large for blacks as it is for whites.
(3)
This model includes all two-way interactions-(city race), (education race), and (age race)-when calculating the race-adjusted wage in each cross-section. Let me emphasize that this regression model is estimated separately in each cross-section, allowing for the average racial wage gap in each city to vary over time, and for the average racial wage gap for each education (or age) group to also vary over time. The crucial property of the binary model is that its residual (i.e., the measure of the race-adjusted wage) does not net out that the racial wage gap for high school dropouts in a particular city (like Miami) might have changed over time. As Table 3 shows, this alternative approach to calculating the raceadjusted wage leads to a much larger wage drop in post-Mariel Miami than in comparison cities, and the estimated wage effects, as in my original paper, are significant. It is easy to illustrate the source of the bias induced by a fully interactive model with a trivial numerical example, summarized in Table 4 . Suppose there are two cities, Miami and New York. New York did not receive any immigrants, but Miami did. The table shows the average wage of black and white low-skill workers in the two cities before and after the supply shock. The top panel gives the unadjusted wage data (i.e., the data that would be available in the CPS). By construction, immigration had a much larger impact on black workers in Miami, reducing their wage from $7 to $4, while the wage of white workers fell by only $1, from $10 to $9.
The middle panel of the table shows the race-adjusted wage in each city. The regression that includes a complete set of interactions between city, education, race, and
year would "see" that there is a $3 racial wage gap among low-skill workers in Miami prior to the supply shock, and use that information to conclude that the race-adjusted wage of a black worker should be $10. After the supply shock, the regression model would "see" a $5 racial wage gap, and use that information to conclude that the race-adjusted wage of a black worker should be $9.
Suppose that half of Miami's workforce is black. The average race-adjusted wage in Miami fell from $10 to $9, or 10 percent. In fact, however, the average wage in Miami fell from $8.50 to $6.50, or nearly a 25 percent drop. Ignoring the fact that the supply shock might have increased the racial wage gap greatly underestimates the wage impact of immigration.
The bottom panel of Table 4 shows what would happen if we used an alternative regression specification that did not "throw the baby out with the bathwater." Suppose, in particular, that Miami is a small city relative to New York, so that the national racial wage gap in the post-migration period is $3. The regression model that includes only a race-year interaction would then yield a race-adjusted post-migration wage for black workers in Miami of $6 (or $3 less than what whites get), indicating that the average race-adjusted wage in Miami fell from $10 to $7.50, or 25 percent.
I can even extend this numerical example in a more subtle direction. Perhaps the $3 racial wage gap in Miami in the pre-migration period represents the "true" (and permanent) discriminatory penalty suffered by low-skill black workers in the Miami labor market. We could then use that information to calculate the race-adjusted wage of a black worker in Miami in the post-migration period, and that race-adjusted wage would again be $6. The average race-adjusted wage in Miami would again fall by 25 percent.
In short, the empirical exercise used to compute the race-adjusted wage in a city at a point in time should not follow blindly from a kitchen-sink approach to regressions. Careful thought must be given to why racial wage differences might arise within skill groups and across cities, how the time trend of those racial differences might be affected by immigration, and exactly which value of the racial "wage penalty" should be used in the calculation of a race-adjusted wage. To the extent that immigration may have contributed to racial wage differences, particularly in post-Mariel Miami, it is incorrect to calculate a race-adjusted wage that nets out that variation. In the end, the use of a simple linear race fixed effect that varies over time, and perhaps even across education groups, seems to be an important virtue of a more sensible research strategy, both because of the small sample sizes involved and because it does not introduce any risk that it inadvertently wipes away the impact we are trying to estimate.
Summary
It is evident that adjusting for the racial composition of the workforce in either the March CPS or the ORG files does not change the key insight of the Mariel reappraisal in Borjas (2017) . The relative wage of low-skill workers in Miami fell significantly in the period after Mariel, reaching a nadir somewhere around the mid-1980s and recovering fully by 1990. The claim that changes in the racial composition of Miami's workforce created a spurious correlation that explains this wage trend is demonstrably false.
